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SOCIAL WELFARE AND SOME IMPLICATIONS OF NON-VIOLENCE
Mulford Q. Sibley
University of Minnesota
A new journal has made its appearance. It is called Soldier of Fortune and
is devoted to the concerns of "professional adventurers"--that is, to those who
would like to become hired violent fighters in various parts of the world. The
journal opens its columns to their advertisements: "Ex-marine seeks employment as
mercenary, full-time or job contract, prefers South or Central America but all
offers considered." "Experienced mature fighter/seeks assignment anywhere.... "
In defending his journal from the charge of encouraging brutality, the founder
says: "After all, booze is brutal, cars are brutal, sex is brutal. There's a need
for guns and explosives, and for adventure in foreign lands .... Sure, some of the
guys who buy it are flamboyant, devil-may-care people, and some are brutal, but
life is brutal, isn't it?" The editorial board is composed of specialist heads of
departments: thus there is a "knives editor," a "terrorism editor," and so on.1
The new journal simply reflects a prevalent extensive commitment to violence
throughout the world and particularly in the United States. Ruth L. Sivard,
author of the recently published World Military and Social Expenditures, 1976,2
dramatizes this devotion against a background of eroding education and social
welfare and of poverty on a gigantic scale. Thus the world as a whole expends
each year some $300 billion on preparation for war and about 60 million persons
throughout the globe owe all or a substantial part of their livelihoods to the
military. During all the period of the SALT talks, armaments continued to in-
crease. In two years of the negotiations, the United States added 2,000 nuclear
weapons to its stockpile (the number went up from 6000 to 8000 strategic nuclear
devices). In the same period, the Soviets escalated, too, although at a somewhat
lesser rate. Total nuclear weapons in the world increased from two in 1945 to
some 12,000 today. Even with such agreements as the nuclear test and non-
proliferation treaties, armaments continued their upward climb.
In this country, two-thirds of all national government employees work for
the Department of Defense. And the great bulk of the national debt was accumu-
lated for warfare, not welfare.
The United States furnishes arms to a wide variety of countries--to both
Jordan and Israel, for example; and the sales (perhaps $12 billion during the
current year) continue to mount, government authorities often defending them on
the ground that they help correct the international "imbalance" of payments.
Domestically, of course, we need only remind ourselves of what is familiar to
every well informed person. Police armaments have escalated during the past five
years, crimes of violence show little indication of sharply declining, and the
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kinds of subtle yet terrible violence reflected in the disintegration of cities
have mounted. And social workers are thoroughly familiar with the increase in
child abuse.
A variety of conditions, of course, contributes to these phenomena. The arms
race, while it exacerbates violence, also reflects international social and
political tensions. Police violence, although it probably does nothing to abate
violent crime as a whole, reflects the genuine concern of citizens for the esca-
lation of violence in general. The advertisements in Soldier of Fortune can per-
haps be connected with a kind of distorted desire to find life exciting--an
effort to break out of our bureaucratized civilization, an endeavor to discover
in killing and intrigue the adventure so often lacking in a complex technological
world.
The pioneers in social work were, of course, familiar with wounds inflicted
by violence in their time and at the same time with the futility of utilizing
violence to heal those wounds. Leaders like Jane Addams and Lilian Wald saw the
poor and the powerless as victims of a violent world--a world which could be met,
not on its own terms, but only under the guidance of a radically different ethic.
They had a vision of humankind which was far in advance of the views prevalent in
their generation. Thus Jane Addams refused to be deceived by the argument that
World War I could in any way contribute to the cause of democracy and peace, even
though she was often ridiculed for her position.
In our day, those devoting their lives to social welfare have a special
responsibility to think through the implications of war and violence--and of
non-violence--for individuals, for groups, and for nations. Among the questions
they should ask themselves are: Why should we be expending 6 to 7% (and upwards
of 10% a bit earlier) of our Gross National Product on the military, as against
about 1% in the last days of Calvin Coolidge as President? What is the relation,
if any, between the commitment to violence and the starvation of social services?
Is there a connection between domestic violence and public commitment to the
international arms race? What are the respective faiths of violence and non-
violence?
It is to the latter question that this paper is centrally devoted, although
in the process we shall be referring to several of the others as well. We
maintain that while disintegrating institutions, conflicts within the psyche, and
many other factors are, of course, important in accounting for the violence of our
world, still that world would not exist without a profound if often unarticulated
faith in the efficacy of violence. Likewise, while the achievement of a non-
violent world will depend upon many institutional and psychological factors, it
cannot be attained unless and until we think through and commit ourselves to a
basic faith in non-violence. The issue, in other terms, is between two faiths--
on the one hand, a devotion to certain myths which sustain violence; on the
other hand, and in sharp contrast, confidence in a series of reverse propositions.
We escalate the arms race because of a faith; and the only way in which we can
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de-escalate it will be to develop a counter-faith from which a non-violent world
will emerge.
What are some of the central elements of this faith in non-violence and its
implications for the practical issues confronting society?
We deal with this question by first turning to a provisional definition of
non-violence; then suggesting some implications of non-violence for personal
relations; and finally, examining its meaning for the social and political world.
Throughout, we shall be insisting that we cannot have it both ways: we cannot
combine social welfare, in the long run, with reliance on violence; nor can we
develop a non-violent society in the absence of an expansion of social welfare in
its several dimensions. And we can no more usher in a world of social equity
through violence than we can speak of "hot ice."
1.
As a kind of provisional or working statement, we may suggest that non-
violence is a view, reflected in practice, which insists that in human relations--
whether personal or socio-political--we respect human beings as ends in themselves
and that we so intend and act that we do not seriously injure them in body, mind,
or spirit. There are two basic elements in this statement: (a) that we do not
intend to injure seriously or irremediably; and (b) that we seek intelligently to
engage only in those actions which will in a particular situation not injure in
fact. Gandhi used the word ahimsa, without harm or injury. We are suggesting
that intentions are never enough; one also has a duty, insofar as one can, to
select consciously and with knowledge only those methods which are likely to lead
to the goal of "harmlessness." This implies that we have a broad and sophisticated
awareness of what the often-complicated consequences of a given act are likely to
be.
The statement, of course, bristles with ambiguities. So long as life exists,
for example, and no matter how careful we are, our means may sometimes lead to
violence. Does this mean that we should therefore give up the attempt to be non-
violent? Of course not. For inaction, by seeming to tolerate the violence built
into the status quo, might itself be encouraging a violence-prone society.
Then, too, the statement in itself says nothing about "force" and "coercion,"
which are themselves very ambiguous terms. Sometimes "force" and "violence" are
equated. We are not doing so. Force and coercion of some kind--physical,
intellectual, spiritual, economic, social--would seem to be inseparable from human
existence, as are "individuality" and "conflict." But not all physical force or
coercion, for example, is violent. When it is used under restrained and circum-
scribed conditions for the purpose of benefiting the individual involved or at
least for ends which do not entail his serious injury, it may be legitimate: the
context of the act is vitally important. When I forcibly pull a child from the
pathway of an automobile, I am not being violent, any more than when I carefully
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but forcibly keep a temporarily deranged person from slashing his wrists. When a
policeman pushes two potential antagonists apart, he is not being violent but
rather is endeavoring to prevent violence. Acts of these kinds are to be sharply
differentiated from, let us say, the bombing of a city, the killing of a "criminal"
by the State (euphemistically called "execution"), or the toleration of social
conditions which lead to gross disrespect for human personality. Shooting a public
official in order to reform society cannot be equated morally with refusal to
co-operate with his illegitimate acts. Both torturing a prisoner and con-
scientiously boycotting a dime store may be regarded as coercive; but surely there
is an important moral distinction.
Applying tests of these kinds, of course, is not always easy. But the drawing
of lines in any application of ethical norms is never without its hazards. All we
can expect of ourselves as rational beings is that we endeavor to be clear in our
own minds about the standards we are seeking to apply and as well-informed and
intelligent as possible in implementing those standards.
But it is extremely important that we have standards of some kind; and the
quest for criteria of non-violence is one which seeks to recognize this importance.
Violence itself may often be due to the fact that we have few if any standards, so
that when we are confronted by a crisis situation we often succumb to the pressures
of the moment which make for violence.
Both from a general viewpoint and particularly from the perspective of social
welfare, it is important to recognize the significance of what is called institu-
tionalized violence. Built into the structure of institutions themselves may be
patterns of severe exploitation and inequity which undermine the norms we have
sought to suggest. A revolutionist hurling a bomb may be protesting an institu-
tional structure more violent than his own act. The advocate of non-violence must
be fully aware of this; and while he will repudiate the methods of the revolutionist,
he will sympathize with his objectives. Non-violence does not imply passivity.
Indeed, it suggests constant activity against injustice, exploitation, war, and
militarism but only by means which differentiate themselves from the spirit of
these phenomena. Thus the worker against injustice will not employ methods which.
themselves tend to encourage injustice (perhaps of another kind); and the advocate
of peace will not use war in a futile effort to gain his end. To wage war tends
to produce more war; to kill or to threaten to kill (whatever the excuse) en-
courages the desire to kill, not the impetus to respect human life.
2.
Now it is with some such conception of non-violence that we approach the
question in terms of personal relations. The ethic of non-retaliation is an
exemplification of the notion of non-violence: I shall not reply in kind to your
failure to show respect for me as a person. If we are seeking the "rehabilitation"
of an individual, we ourselves must be impeccable by setting the standard for non-
retaliatory action. We cannot teach a thief to be honest by stealing from him; a
person to be loving by exemplifying hate; or a victim of an exploitative social sys-
tem to gain self-respect by treating him as if he were not worthy of respect. The
only hope is to make a kind of leap of faith and to see in the thief a person who
can transcend his past; in the person consumed by hatred an individual who has
possibilities of exemplifying love; and in the victim of exploitation, one who
can rise above his low self-esteem if only others treat him not so much as the man
he is but as the man he can be. In all these situations, imagination is an
important ingredient of non-violence and non-retaliation. The unimaginative indi-
vidual is one who cannot see beyond the present to the potential. There will, of
course, be failures if we act in this manner; but the failures will be far greater
if we implement the reverse attitude.
One of the interesting but unsolved problems (at least it would seem difficult
to subject to a scientific test) is the effect of public violence on the domaip of
personal violence. If the State and public officials are committed to an ethic of
retaliation or of violence, is it not reasonable to assume that their prestige
will affect the ways in which we treat one another in private relations? If the
State threatens to wipe out Moscow under certain circumstances, why is not this
a kind of moral license for me or my organization to threaten to obliterate my
enemies under specified conditions? When a gang "rubs out" the leaders of an
opposing organization, it may be reinforced in its action by the fact that the
government "rubs out" its international supposed enemies. After all, what is
the difference morally between a plan to kill Castro or thousands of Japanese in
Nagasaki and a scheme of the "Cosa Nostra" to liquidate physically those who
challenge it? During the Vietnam War, I remember asking a social psychologist
whether there was a relation between the terror bombings and massacres being
carried out in Vietnam under the auspices of the government and the seemingly
increasing disrespect for human life within the United States. His reply was that
he saw every reason for assuming this to be true. Confucius would apparently have
given the same answer, for much of his political philosophy is rooted in the notion
of the ruler as "exemplar." The Emperor in his official acts must set the example
for his subjects in their private relations; for while institutional authority--
that which goes beyond any given ruler--is important, still if the ruler himself
sets the wrong example, how can one expect his subjects to act rightly?
At least this is a hypothesis worth considering.
To be sure, the incidence of public violence may also be affected by the pre-
valence of private violence. The police become more menacing in response to the
growth of crime; and reliance on international weaponry is part and parcel of the
ethos of private violence. We can admit all this and still plausibly contend,
however, that the probability is that the influence is heavily weighted the other
way. Rulers and political systems carry with them the prestige and the authority
of a whole society and so there is a tendency on the part of private individuals to
conclude that if a thing is permissible in public action, it must also be morally
acceptable (if not legally so) in private affairs. There is some evidence, for
example,--although it should not be considered conclusive--that, other things being
equal, countries enforcing the death penalty encourage murders. We do know that
the death penalty apparently does not discourage killing.
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We might also observe that insofar as we already adhere to the ethic of non-
violence in private relations, it is not primarily as the result of threats by the
police but rather because, to a very widespread extent, even in a violent culture,
most human beings have the faith, exemplified in habit patterns, that all human
beings are capable of love and intrinsically worthy of respect. Generally speaking,
if we trust the other person, he will justify that trust; and while there will be
many exceptions to this rule, without its presence anything resembling a human
community would be impossible. Insofar as the police are "effective," it is
because a sufficient level of community exists to make them so.
Implicitly, the profession of social work is committed to the notion of non-
violence in personal relations, else it denies its reason for being. Whatever
the context might be, it, above all professions, should be anchored in the faith
that there is that within each human being, however it may have been suppressed or
concealed by institutionalized exploitation and violence or psychological factors
or misfortune, which makes for the possibility of rationality, love, and non-
violence. One way of uncovering this quality is for others to see it even before
the individual is aware of it himself. The individual can regain his or her
self-respect if others show their respect for him not as he apparently is in the
existential situation but rather as he can become. When he is at length aware
of others' respect and confidence, demonstrated through actions and not merely
talk, he will eventually re-discover his own worth and rebuild his own respect.
Whether the individual be a murderer, a welfare mother, a poverty-stricken child,
or an individual distraught by psychological conflicts and guilt, a key factor in
the philosophy of social work is the restoration of self-respect. And this can
be accomplished only in close association with the principles of non-violence.
But so closely are public and private realms associated in the modern world
that the very basis for non-violence and self-respect in personal relations is
heavily conditioned on our attempting to implement the principle in the public
realm as well. So long as we are strongly committed to the ethos of violence in
politics and the organization of society, we shall be limited in what we can do
to develop justice and non-violence in the private sphere. This is true first of
all because, as we have suggested, the public example will tend to affect practices
in the realm of personal conduct and, secondly, because heavy commitment to vio-
lence will, both financially and psychologically, deprive social welfare broadly
conceived (social work, education, mental health, and so on) of indispensable
resources of scarce goods and equally essential resources of spirit and morale.
3.
In a celebrated passage, the late R.H. Tawney comments, in the context of
sixteenth century economic development, on the human race's proclivity for wasting
its substance through violence and war:
Mankind, it seems, hates nothing so much as its own
prosperity. Menaced with an accession of riches which would
lighten its toil, it makes haste to redouble its labors, and
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to pour away the perilous stuff, which might deprive of
plausibility the complaint that it is poor. Applied to the
arts of peace, the new resources commanded by Europe during
the first half of the sixteenth century might have done some-
thing to exorcise the specters of pestilence and famine, and
to raise the material fabric of civilization to undreamed-of
heights. Its rulers, secular and ecclesiastical alike, thought
otherwise. When pestilence and famine were ceasing to be
necessities imposed by nature, they re-established themselves
by political art.
The sluice which they opened to drain away each new
accession of superfluous wealth was war.3
Tawney's observations about the sixteenth century are fully applicable to the
past century and a half of modern history. We might even expand the analysis: not
only does war drain away the "surplus" of wealth, but it also frustrates social
reform and tends to promote social chaos. Violent revolutionary forces are re-
leased and family life is disrupted.
The problem of non-violence in the public order is whether we can reverse
these historical trends. It will not be easy, for even the history of the United
States, which we have often thought of as relatively immune from many of the main
currents of world history, reveals the tendency.
Recall, for example, American experience in the twentieth century. The early
part of the century was characterized by considerable expansion of the economy and,
after 1913, by important social reform measures which, had they been continued,
might have resulted in some genuine re-distribution of wealth and power. But
these possibilities were frustrated when the country entered World War I, which
greatly enhanced the resources and power of the wealthy and brought an end--as do
most wars--to any desirable social reforms. Perhaps all this might have been
justified, according to some, had the war accomplished much that was worth-while;
but it did not: it neither made the world "safe" for democracy nor brought about
a situation in which war was less likely in the future. And the resources
destroyed by the war, whether in the United States or elsewhere, were staggering.
A monetary world cost estimate of $400 billion scarcely does justice to the fact
that many of these resources were irreplaceable; and it speaks not at all of the
tens of millions of human lives wiped out.
Or again, World War II came to the United States after a period of social
reform--some of it surely desirable--which the war promptly halted while providing
a facade of "war prosperity." The destruction wrought by World War II was far
greater than that of World War I and the net benefit to the world or to the United
States even more dubious. Psychologically, perhaps, American entry could be
partly interpreted as an effort through war to counteract or plaster over the
failure to take the United States out of the Great Depression without war. The war
virtually eliminated unemployment, which was still 9 million at the end of 1939,
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but at a fearful price.
But no more than World War I did it make the world "safe for democracy." While
it appeared to destroy one "totalitarian" system--that of Nazi Germany--it did so
at the price of greatly expanding the power of another--the Soviet Union. And
its temporary solution for the problem of unemployed men and women--in the war the
solution was that men were employed blowing other men and natural resources to bits-.
was followed by chaos and many smaller though often ferocious wars throughout the
earth. While the violence of the war helped force Hitler's death, it left many of
the basic issues confronting mankind unresolved or exacerbated. A tyrant died but
tyranny proliferated. The war gave birth, moreover, to the atomic bomb, which has
cast its shadow over the entire period since World War II.
During the period between 1961 and 1964, there seemed to be some promise
again of using vast potential resources for human welfare, through the "war on
poverty," the development of civil rights, and imaginative schemes like some of
the housing programs. But again the potential was in considerable measure
frustrated when the United States began its massive violence against Vietnam--at
an ultimate cost of perhaps $150 billion.4 And after the war--as has been usual
in wars from ancient to modern times--came the inflation which eroded the savings
of millions of the poor and middle classes and, accompanied by another "recession,"
severely restricted possibilities for social justice. And the Vietnam war, like
its predecessors, gave no evidence that it had improved the lot of humankind in
any significant ways.
During the Vietnam War, it was first believed that we could have both "guns"
and"butter." But it soon became evident that, whatever the possibilities from a
strictly economic and financial point of view, in terms of psychology it was diffi-
cult if not impossible to combine the huge commitment to violence with serious
efforts for social welfare.
And now, in the post-war period, educational budgets do not keep pace with
inflation, the war against poverty continues to be undermined, and social service
work in many of its most vital aspects is curtailed. Moreover, numerous sections
of the central cities remind one more and more of urban areas that have been bombed
or otherwise destroyed in war. Yet the shopping list for armaments continues to
grow.
To be sure, we are told that military violence and its threat promote "securi-
ty." But the meaning of this statement is not at all clear. If it implies that
once we have a certain level of "over-kill" (the ability, let us say, to wipe out
the "enemy" five or six times over), we shall no longer be fearful and can halt
the arms build-up, it would seem obviously to be a false proposition; for it would
appear that the higher our arms levels, the more fearful we become that they are
not high enough. Expansion of armaments, far from reassuring us, seems to
stimulate still more expansion. The greater the "over-kill" capacity, the more we
feel the need for additional and even more monstrous weapons. It is almost certain
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that a citizen of the United States feels far more insecure with respect to external
"enemies" than the citizen of a third or fourth rate "power" like Denmark.
Perhaps, though, possession of great arms in face of the enemy's escalation
will deter from war. But this would seem very unlikely. While we can never prove
beyond the shadow of any doubt that large armaments and arms races do not prevent
war, since there are so many variables, the experience of the arms race before
World War I is not reassuring. Far more plausible is the proposition that if a
nation prepares for war through arms escalation, it will eventually be tempted to
use those arms.
But if war does come, it may be urged, surely great armaments will tend to pre-
vent invasion and to protect human beings. But there is little if any evidence to
show this, particularly in the modern age. In World War II, for example, both
Denmark and Norway, with tiny military forces, were invaded; but so were Germany.
France, Poland, and the Soviet Union, ,ith huge military establishments. As for
protecting human life in time of war, even the best military "defense" cannot pre-
vent millions of deaths: in the United States, for example, writers speak in
terms of fifty or more millions. 5 Under these circumstances, it is a mockery to
speak of the military preserving human lives.
We argue, then, that build-up of armaments in today's context promotes fear
and insecurity among citizens of Great Powers, including the United States; that
large armaments will not deter from war but, on the contrary, will probably consti-
tute a temptation to initiate it; and that once a nation enters war large armaments
give no assurance whatsoever that the country will not be invaded or that millions
of its citizens will not die. Armaments, in other words, have very little to do
with "security." On the contrary, they probably exacerbate insecurity.
But if we reach this conclusion, it would seem to be useless to maintain mili-
tary forces. If their existence does nothing to allay fear, probably cannot deter
from war, and can neither prevent invasion nor protect human beings, it would seem
unreasonable to retain them.
In other words, if we are convinced that public violence and its threat are
not only immoral but inefficacious (in terms of worth-while objectives), then a
nation is foolish to rely on them even if other nations choose to do so. Willing-
ness and readiness to disarm unilaterally would seem to be a part of practical
wisdom as well as a requirement of any commitment to non-violence as a moral
principle.
Just what might unilateral disarmament imply in terms of details?
The policy might conceivably begin with a public announcement of what is con-
templated. A government just elected on a platform of unilateral disarmament
would state that it had lost all confidence in military violence and was determined
during the course of, say, five years to divest itself of all military weapons. It
would invite representatives of all countries to observe the process. Among the
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first steps would be abolition of the CIA and other secret intelligence agencies.
Then gradually, year by year, armaments in all categories would be reduced. Gra-
dualness would be desirable to permit orderly economic and social adjustments.
Meanwhile, as part of the process, there would have been an announcement that
the resources saved by unilateral disarmament would not lead to a reduction in
taxes but rather to alternative expenditures on what might roughly be called
"social welfare"--education, counselling services, exportation of skills to develop
trained manpower in parts of the world requesting it, rehabilitation of cities,
and the organization of a system of non-violent resistance to any invasion. There
might be a pledge to devote approximately one half of all present military
expenditures to international purposes (under the control of an international
agency) and one half to domestic goals for a generation. This would mean that
each year during the disarmament process, about 10% of existing "defense" expendi-
tures (over $10 billion) would be contributed for world purposes and 10% to
rehabilitating a sorely disintegrating domestic society. At the end of five years,
each segment would be receiving at least $50 billion annually for a minimum of at
least a quarter of a century.
If one attempts to spend $50 billion for non-military purposes, even in an
age of inflation, one is startled by what one can buy. For example, one could
support 200 large universities; or provide 12 million full scholarships for col-
lege students; or establish some half a million to a million substantial day care
centers; or pay the salaries of more than three million special education teachers
to stimulate gifted children and assist the retarded; or furnish over three
million social workers in such fields as psychiatric social work, family welfare,
and many others; or finance between three and four million national park attendants;
and so on. One can work out one's own calculations and no matter what they are,
they must be astounding. And these are figures only for the domestic side; an
equal sum would be available for the international and it would probably go even
further.
Sometimes it is argued that without heavy emphasis on "defense" and on war
preparation the unemployment problem would necessarily be much worse than it is
today. But the fact is that, on the average, a given sum expended in the civilian
sector will produce more employment than if used by the military. Moreover,
civilian employment tends to be less inflationary than "defense" employment.
Explains an economist who has studied the problem: "I think economists would
generally agree that it is a misconception that defense creates more jobs ....
Defense, particularly modern defense, is a high technology business. Defense
production tends to require more highly skilled people but to employ fewer people
per unit of output that civilian industry. It also puts pressure on prices. It
creates buying power, but does not produce goods that can be bought in the market....
High defense spending for these reasons has an inflation-inducing effect."
6
We cannot predict with any exactitude, of course, what reactions a program of
unilateral disarmament by a major nation would provoke. But one thing would seem
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to be certain: the situation of today, based as it is on competitive armaments
and an almost irrational confidence in military might, would be drastically
altered both psychologically and sociologically. In many parts of the world,
including the Soviet Union, there would probably be strong domestic pressures
to emulate the United States in its unorthodox actions; for it is notorious that
the clamor for more consumers goods in Russia and elsewhere is already very strong.
A unilateral initiative of this kind might, in fact, lead to competitive dis-
armament. But even if this response did not occur, the unilateral disarmament
would continue, on the premise that it was soundly based, both in morality and
in terms of practical efficacy.
Those with a deep commitment to the principle of non-violence would hold,
of course, that a policy of this kind would be far more effective as a national
defense measure than all the armaments we presently possess. But whether or not
one agrees or disagrees with this conclusion depends in part on how one thinks of
"national defense." Here we define it roughly as "The preservation and enhance-
ment of human life and of the basic morally defensible institutions and practices
of a nation." This definition would exclude from the term international economic
exploitation, military power as an end in itself, or the quest for dominion over
others. The new utilization of the resources formerly devoted to the military
would defend in a number of ways: first, moral duties to mankind would be much
more emphatically recognized than today and a by-product of this would probably
be that any possible justification for invading the country (always a specter
for those insisting on military national defense) would be reduced to the vani-
shing point; secondly, the new outlook would understand that perhaps the greatest
menace to the life and institutions of a people comes from within rather than
from without--from deteriorating cities, hopeless young people, absence of con-
structive challenges, unemployment, inadequate education, human alienation, and
so on;
7 thirdly, the policy, by confining "defense" to vindication of those
things that are worth-while and excluding those objectives which make for in-
justice would clearly see that genuine peace and national defense depend on the
establishment of justice.
Part of the policy, of course, would be provision for non-violent resistance
to any possible invasion or occupation. Those committed to non-violence would
believe that if other elements of the policy were implemented, the necessity for
non-violent resistance would be remote. Nevertheless, provision would be made
for it, as an aspect of the whole scheme.
Basically, non-violent resistance would be a program in which several
thousand selected individuals would be highly trained to lead the population in
campaigns of non-co-operation with invading or occupying forces. Strategies and
tactics involving the strike, the boycott, and the withholding of moral support
would be planned for; and training would be rigorous. No occupying force can
long hold a country if non-violent non-co-operation is widespread and if human
beings are willing to die (but not to kill) for their country. The whole train-
ing of non-violent resisters would be premised on such propositions. If one
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leader were to be killed by the army of occupation, the "game plan" of non-violent
resistance would provide for immediate succession of another. The professionals in
non-violent resistance would, of course, guide the non-professionals in the tac-
tics to be used. The budget would include an item of, let us say, $5 billion a
year for non-violent resistance training. One of the military service academies
would be retained to help educate leaders of the new strategy.8
Does a policy of unilateral disarmament involve risks? Of course. But we
contend that the risks are far fewer than those entailed by a commitment to violent
defense. It could be that under a scheme of unilateral disarmament, some nation
would become utterly irrational and seek to invade the country. But surely
this is much less likely than with present policies. In an atmosphere of com-
petitive armaments, irrationality is much more apt to erupt than in one where a
prominent nation has renounced violent defense. What possible purpose would be
served by a military invasion of the United States? After all, it would already
be sharing its resources on a large scale, would have indicated its non-aggressive
intent by unilateral disarmament, and would have opened all of its genuinely pub-
lic business to world scrutiny. If under these circumstances another nation still
contemplated invasion, it would have to weigh the costs of occupying a country in
face of the most effective form of resistance, that of the non-violent type.
The notion of unilateralism is, we are contending, entirely compatible with
hard-headed military and political realism. The unrealistic, in fact, are those
who think that preparation for military violence has anything to do with national
defense. After studying military history for a lifetime, the late Walter Millis,
perhaps the United States' greatest twentieth century military historian, main-
tained that "a good theoretical case can be made for the proposition that a
unilateral divestiture.. .would in fact redound more to the real security and wel-
fare of the American people than any other course.. ."9 While Millis thought that
the American people were not yet ready to accept such a policy, this did not
detract from its soundness; and one might well ask Walter Millis why, if he
could be convinced of its soundness, the American people could not be.
A policy of unilateral disarmament within the context suggested here would
greatly strengthen the health, welfare, and spirit of the American people--surely
one of the central objectives of genuine national defense. In a context where
"defense" is largely identified with military violence, the tendency is to forget
the limitations of military power and at the same time the possibilities of non-
violence. The public mind, moreover, is split--on the one hand, it repeats that
its objectives are peace and non-violence; on the other hand, it devotes a sub-
stantial proportion of its resources to means which are the antitheses of these
objectives. This hardly makes for a state of public mental health. In a context
of unilateralism, this split public personality would be eliminated and the very
"nakedness" of the country in terms of possessing military weapons would tend to
produce a psychology of security. Every encouragement would be given to non-
violent solutions. Once faith in military violence had been completely eroded,
the way would have been paved for a commitment not dependent on the shallow faith
in violence.
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In personal relations, we often say: "Jones was utterly disarming," meaning
that he was not close-minded, not fearful, and not aggressive; instead, he opened
the way to full communication with and understanding of others. A like principle
might apply in the context of unilateralism. The nation would be literally dis-
armed and would therefore be disarming, with consequences not unlike those we
think of in personal relations. This is not to equate personal with corporate
relations in all circumstances but simply to suggest that in the context of dis-
armament a similar consequence would probably follow.
It should be emphasized, of course, that unilateralism is dependent on a
basic change of attitudes and values in the country as a whole. It would not
"work" if substantial segments of the population continued actively to commit
themselves to violence. It would entail, in other words, a fundamental alteration
of public opinion.
10
To be consistent, too, it would need to be accompanied by other measures
exemplifying non-violence in the public arena. For example, the police would
have to be disarmed and individuals, too, would have to renounce their "right"
to bear arms. Any thought of "capital punishment" or killing by the State would
have to be eliminated; and some of the worst outrages going on under the name of
"prison" would need to vanish. We should also have to reduce the gap between
lowest and highest incomes. Not that all these transformations would need to
come about immediately but rather that they would be seen from the beginning as
essential if policies of non-olence were to be fully implemented.
Overly simplifying, we can say that there are two basic views of the State
and of law. One thinks of them as repressive--as essentially existing to suppress
the evil in man. Here the accent is on force and negation and even violence. The
other view would see the State and law as potentially positive--as devices for
helping to release the good in human beings and to organize the community in such
a way that evil is overcome not by repression but by so accenting the constructive
that the darker side of human nature fades into the background. The notion of non-
violence would obviously fit into the latter paradigm, as would, if the interpre-
tation of this paper is correct, the philosophical foundations of social work.
Obviously, both of these paradigms are present in the State and law of our
day. When law facilitates the making of agreements, the organization of public
enterprises for public benefit, and arbitration procedures, the second is obviously
involved. When it sends a person to a prison which will obviously not "reform"
him, the first is present. When the State provides an educational system, the
second is predominant; when it orders me to kill, the first is ubiquitous.
The task of those committed to non-violence in the public realm is to explore
all of the avenues open through the second paradigm and to insist that the con-
ception of non-violence, contrary to writers like the late Reinhold Niebuhr, is
applicable not only to personal matters but also to group relations and in
politics.11 In the process of attempting to implement the second paradigm
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imaginatively, social workers and others strengthen not only the cause of non-
violence but also that of social welfare in its broadest dimensions. But they
should be consistent: non-violence is a philosophy which must be applied uni-
versally and not in such a way that some areas of human life are exempt from
its impact. We cannot consistently promote it in personal relations and then
attack it by supporting violence and its threat in the international sphere.
4.
We began by calling attention to some of the striking exemplifications of
the modern world's faith in violence and suggested that non-violence implies a
counter-faith. We then explored the elements of that counter-faith in terms
of defining it; of suggesting its application to personal relations; and of
outlining a few of its implications for the public sphere.
We have not denied that a gigantic leap is necessary to move from the faith
in violence to the counter-faith of non-violence. Nevertheless, we stressed that
in most relations of life, even today, there is at least a semi-commitment to
non-violence. Our task, whether as social workers or as citizens, is to extend
that faith into areas where up to now it has seemed unthinkable.
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llNiebuhr tended to distinguish the possibilities for morality in personal
relations from potentialities in group or political relations, particularly
in Moral Man and Immoral Society (N.Y. : Scribner, 1932) but also in many other
works. In terms violence and non-violence, his expectations for groups and
nations were much lower than those for individuals. While he makes an important
point in emphasizing that institutions and organizations are not persons and
cannot be said to be capable of love, still it is also true that individuals
(who admittedly are capable of love and non-violence) work within the frame-
works of institutions and organizations and have the capacity for transforming
the latter. There would be no groups if individuals did not exist; and while
group life has an autonomy of its own, still, we may say to Niebuhr, the atti-
tudes and convictions of individuals surely have an impact on the group, and
their ideals, however "impossible," can change the nature of group relations.
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